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MARKET INTERVENTION BY THE COURTS:
THE ECONOMICS OF OCCUPATIONAL
BOUNDARY-SETTING
STEVEN B. JOHNSON* and JOHN B. CORGEL**
I. INTRODUCTION:
Market intervention by the courts may take many forms and
may occur in a variety of contexts.' Sometimes even the most
obscure types of judicial decisions can exert a significant impact on
the efficiency of exchange (i.e., the price-quality equilibrium) in
the market.2 Consequently, one criterion for evaluating legal pre-
cedent is its impact, if any, on the efficiency of exchange in the
market.
An area where the courts have, either consciously or uncon-
sciously, confronted the question of whether to intervene in the
market is in the resolution of jurisdictional boundary disputes be-
tween licensed occupations.3 Jurisdictional boundaries between
occupations define the types of services that may be offered by an
occupational group and determine whether that occupational
group has an exclusive right to provide those services. Some
courts, for example, have held that only attorneys may prepare
sales contracts, deeds, mortgages, and other legal documents in-
volved in a real estate transaction, while real estate brokers, agents
and title insurers may fill in the blanks of prepared documents only
if they do not extend the authority of those documents., Since
there are many services that could conceivably be offered by more
than one occupational group, the establishment of jurisdictional
boundaries by the courts may have a significant impact on the effi-
ciency of exchange in a wide variety of service markets.
Assistant Professor, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
* Associate Professor, Georgia State University.
I For example, an injunction against copyright or patent infringement is a type of
market intervention by the courts.
2 For example, a decision as to whether a book, movie, or magazine is "pornographic"
and can thus be banned by a state government exercising its police power, or whether it has
"redeeming social value" and is thus protected under the First Amendment, can exert a
significant impact on the market. While such a decision is apparently concerned with ar-
tistic, not economic, issues, its economic impact is an important concern as well.
3 Boundary-setting between licensed and nonlicensed practitioners of a particular oc-
cupation is a closely related issue which this paper implicitly addresses.
4 E.g., State Bar v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 91 N.M. 434, 575 P.2d 443 (1978);
Hulse v. Criger, 363 Mo. 26, 247 S.W.2d 855 (1952). See Brossman & Rosenberg, Title
Companies and the Unauthorized Practice Rules: The Exclusive Domain Reexamined, 83
DICKINsON L. REv. 437, 459-61 (1979); Shedd, Real Estate Agents and the Unauthorized
Practice of Law, 10 REAL ESTATE L.J. 135 (1981).
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the manner in which
courts have resolved jurisdictional disputes between licensed oc-
cupations and determine whether the precedents established have
tended to promote or impede the efficiency of exchange in the
service markets. The first section reviews the manner in which state
and federal courts have resolved occupational boundary disputes.
The next section addresses the economics of occupational
boundary-setting. This economic theory is utilized in the third sec-
tion to assess the relative efficiency of occupational boundary-
setting by the various state courts. A summary of the results and
conclusions is presented in the final section. For purposes of the
study, the existence of occupational licensing, while presenting
some interesting issues of its own, is taken as given.'
iI. JUDICIAL RESOLUTION OF JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES BETWEEN
LICENSED OCCUPATIONS
A survey of state court decisions reveals that, in general, state
courts have tended to resolve jurisdictional disputes between
licensed occupations by categorizing the disputed services as
either:
(1) services which may be marketed only by members of a par-
ticular licensed occupational group;' or
(2) services which may be provided by members of more than one
occupational group if: (a) provision of such services is "in-
cidental" to the provision of related services that the occupa-
tional group is already licensed to market; and (b) no separate
fee is charged for the provision of these "incidental" services.
5 The occupational licensing literature is, extensive. In addition to the studies cited
elsewhere in this paper, works in this area include: M. FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND
FREEDOM 137-60 (1962); Holen, Effects of Professional Licensing Arrangements on In-
terstate Labor Mobility and Resource Allocation, 73 J. PoL. ECON. 492 (1965); Maurizi,
OccupationalLicensing and the Public Interest, 82 J. POL. ECON. 399 (1974); Gellhorn, The
Abuse of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1976); Stolar, Occupational Li-
censing: An Antitrust Analysis, 41 Mo. L. REv. 66 (1976); Leffler, Physician Licensure:
Competition and Monopoly in American Medicine, 21 J. L. & ECON. 165 (1978); Shepard,
Licensing Restrictions and the Cost of Dental Care, 21 J. L. & ECON. 187 (1978); White,
Dynamic Elements of Regulation: The Case of Occupational Licensure, 1 RESEARCH IN
LAW AND ECON. 15 (1979); Carroll & Gaston, State Occupational Licensing Provisions and
Quality of Service: The Real Estate Business, I RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECON. 1 (1979);
Smith, Production of Licensing Legislation: An Economic Analysis of Interstate Dif-
ferences, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 117 (1982); Johnson & Corgel, Antitrust Immunity and the
Economics of Occupational Licensing, 20 AM. Bus. L.J. 471 (1983).
6 In most cases, no jurisdictional boundary dispute arises when the seller of the disputed
service does not hold himself out to the public as offering the service for sale and provides
the service without charge. Hence, the term "marketed" refers to the act of holding oneself
out as providing the service for compensation.
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A survey of federal court decisions reveals that, in general, federal
courts have tended to deal with such disputes by either dismissing
them on jurisdictional grounds' or concluding that the disputed
services are immune from state licensing requirements:
(1) under the "federal supremacy doctrine" because they are
authorized by federal administrative or other authority;
(2) under federal antitrust law; or
(3) because they are protected by either the first, fifth, or four-
teenth amendment.
A. Resolution of Occupational Boundary Disputes
by State Courts
State courts tend to agree that each occupational group licensed
by the state has a core of services which it is uniquely qualified to
provide and should, therefore, be marketed only by its members.
For example, lawyers are generally acknowledged to be uniquely
qualified to provide courtroom advocacy, physicians to diagnose
and treat disease, and certified public accountants to audit and ex-
press opinions on a firm's financial statements.
Most occupational boundary disputes that come before state
courts involve the allegation that some party has engaged in the
unauthorized practice of a particular licensed occupation and
should, therefore, be: (1) denied compensation for the disputed
sevices; (2) enjoined from further provision of such services;
and/or (3) fined or otherwise penalized for providing these serv-
ices. In general, state statutes concerning unauthorized practice
tend to provide little practical guidance in resolving such ques-
tions, and the law in this area has, therefore, tended to be largely
judicially-derived.8
While state courts tend to agree in principle that each licensed
occupational group is uniquely qualified in some respect, they
generally do not agree as to just which services should be restricted
to which occupations. More specifically, state courts often differ
7 Since these cases generally do not involve diversity between the parties (as required for
federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976)), they must establish the presence of a
federal question (as required for federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976 & Supp.
V. 1981)). In the vast majority of these cases, however, federal courts have concluded that
the dispute centers around an interpretation of state law, rather than a federal question.
8 For example, most statutes simply prohibit the unauthorized practice of law, medicine,
etc., without defining their respective scope of activities. Some states adopt a circular ap-
proach by defining the practice of law as what lawyers do, medicine as what physicians do,
etc. See Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1981).
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over the question of whether other occupational groups ought to
be allowed to perform services that are closely related to those fall-
ig in or near the core of a particular licensed occupation. For ex-
ample, they have reached different results on the question of
whether an accountant preparing a client's federal income tax
return ought to be allowed to resolve questions of tax law without
seeking the advice of an attorney.9
At one end of the spectrum are courts in states such as Penn-
sylvania and Minnesota, that generally allow other occupational
groups to provide services falling in or near the core of a particular
licensed occupation if the services are "incidental" to the perfor-
mance of services that they are already licensed to market and if no
separate fee is charged for these services. Such courts generally re-
quire that the party alleging unauthorized practice bear the burden
of proving that the disputed service: (1) is within the core of a
licensed occupation of which the seller is not a member; and (2) is
not ancillary to the performance of some service that the seller is
licensed to market. Further, to establish unauthorized practice it
must be demonstrated that the seller: (1) held himself or herself
out as being specially qualified to perform the disputed service;
and (2) sought separate compensation for providing the disputed
service.II
At the other end of the spectrum are courts in states such as
Kentucky and Florida, that rarely allow other occupational groups
to provide services that fail in or near the core of a particular
licensed occupation, even if the services are "incidental" and no
separate fee is charged. Such courts generally require that the par-
ty alleging unauthorized practice prove only that: (1) the disputed
service is within the realm of a particular licensed occupation of
which the seller is not a member; and (2) the seller sought compen-
sation, directly or indirectly, for providing the disputed service.
These courts attach little importance to the fact that the disputed
service is merely "incidental" to the provision of some service the
seller is licensed to market."
State courts that construe the "incidental services "doctrine nar-
rowly, thereby drawing relatively rigid boundaries between oc-
9 See e.g., Bittker, Does Tax Practice by Accountants Constitute the Unauthorized
Practice of Law?, 24 J. Tax. 184 (1966) and Misiewicz and Parsons, When Does Tax Work
by an Accountant Constitute Unlawful Practice of Law?, 16 TAX. Accrs. 172 (1977).
10 See, e.g., Brossman & Rosenberg, supra note 4; Weckstein, Limitations on the Right
to Counsel: The Unauthorized Practice of Law, 1978 UTAH L. REv. 649 (1978).
11 Id.
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cupations, tend to affect service markets differently than do courts
that construe the doctrine broadly, drawing less rigid boundaries.
Consumers in states like Pennsylvania and Minnesota, whose
courts fall in the latter category, enjoy a wide choice of sellers
from whom to purchase various services, while similar consumers
in states like Kentucky and Florida, whose states fall in the former
category, are restricted to a much narrower choice of sellers.
B. Resolution of Occupational Boundary Disputes
by Federal Courts
Federal courts generally dismiss, on jurisdictional grounds,
cases involving boundary disputes between state-licensed occupa-
tions, unless the right of the occupational group or practitioner to
provide the disputed service is protected under the "federal
supremacy doctrine," federal antitrust law, or the first, fifth, or
fourteenth amendment. Unlike state courts, whose function is to
determine the appropriate application of the state's statutory
scheme for prohibiting unauthorized practice of state-licensed oc-
cupations, federal courts are concerned with the constitutional and
antitrust validity of the scheme or a particular application of it.
Although the actual number of federal cases in this area is relative-
ly small,' it is possible to draw certain inferences about the types
of statutory schemes that have been invalidated.
Applications of unauthorized practice schemes that have been
invalidated because of incompatibility with the federal supremacy
doctrine generally involve an unlicensed practitioner who is
authorized by a federal agency to provide some service which also
falls within the realm of a state-licensed occupation. For example,
the Supreme Court has held that a nonlawyer who is authorized by
the U.S. Patent Office to file patent applications and represent ap-
plicants in administrative proceedings before that agency is not
guilty of the unauthorized practice of law because of immunity
under the federal supremacy doctrine." This immunity prevents
unauthorized practice schemes from interfering with federal agen-
cies operating within a state.
Application of a state's unauthorized practice scheme is barred
by federal antitrust law when it is shown that the application: (1) is
12 Rhode, supra note 8, at 44, notes that of the 84 reported decisions involving allega-
tions of unauthorized practice of law between 1970 and 1980, only ten considered first
amendment claims and three considered due process claims.
13 Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
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not a valid exercise of state police power; and (2) constitutes a
"'conspiracy in restraint of trade.""' In one such case, a federal
court held that a state bar's unauthorized practice committee ad-
visory opinions that prohibited lay employees from engaging in
title search activities on behalf of a title insurance company, cou-
pled with the threat of disciplinary proceedings, constituted an ille-
gal restraint of trade under the Sherman Act."
Finally, applications of unauthorized practice schemes have
been invalidated when incompatible with the first, fifth, or four-
teenth amendment. Invalidation under the first amendment may
occur if application of the scheme unjustifiably restricts both a
practitioner's ability to convey information and the public's op-
portunity to receive it. For example, the Supreme Court has
upheld the right of the NAACP to counsel and refer individuals to
its affiliated attorneys as a form of political expression protected
by the first amendment. 6 Invalidation under the fifth or four-
teenth amendment may occur if application of the scheme effec-
tively denies "due process" to individuals wishing to offer a par-
ticular service for sale in the market. A scheme does not satisfy due
process if it fails to ensure dispassionate administration free from
the taint of self-interest. For example, federal courts have held
that a board composed solely of optometrists in private practice
lacked the requisite impartiality to rule on matters concerning the
unauthorized practice of optometry because of their economic
stake in the outcome of each ruling.7
C. The Relative Roles of State and Federal Courts
While federal courts monitor important constitutional and an-
titrust aspects of unauthorized practice schemes, state courts
decide how jurisdictional boundaries are actually drawn between
licensed occupations. Consequently, the most important determi-
nant of how a judicially-derived occupational boundary-setting
scheme affects the service markets is whether state courts apply the
"incidental services doctrine" broadly or narrowly.
14 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1980).
15 Surety Title Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Virginia State Bar, 431 F. Supp. 298 (E.D. Va.
1977), order vacated pending resolution of state law question, 571 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 941 (1978).
16 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
17 Gibson v. Berryhill, 331 F. Supp. 122 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd, 411 U.S. 564 (1973).
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III. THE ECONOMICS OF OCCUPATIONAL BOUNDARY-SETTING
Boundary-setting for licensed occupations can exert a signifi-
cant impact on the efficiency of exchange (i.e., the price-quality
equilibrium) in the service markets. The magnitude of this impact
is determined by three factors:
(1) the extent to which occupational groups that are tech-
nologically capable of supplying the restricted services are
excluded from the market by boundary-setting;
(2) the elasticity of demand for the restricted services; and
(3) the extent of "informational asymmetry" in the market for
the restricted services."
A. Extent to Which Boundary-Setting Excludes Potential
Suppliers from the Market
To determine the extent to which boundary-setting excludes
potential suppliers from the market, it is useful to view each poten-
tial supplier of a service as a "firm" that desires to enter the
market. In the absence of legal barriers, generally the most impor-
tant determinant of a firm's ability to supply a service is the seller's
expertise."'
Expertise is acquired by the training an individual receives and
can be either "general" or "specific." ' 20 "General training" pro-
vides an individual with expertise that is applicable in a wide vari-
ety of situations and localities. Examples of general training in-
clude a medical school education or the completion of an appren-
ticeship to become a journeyman electrician. "Specific training"
provides individuals with expertise that is applicable only in a par-
ticular situation or locality. Examples of specific training include
certain types of military training that are only of limited use to
civilians, such as artillary training, or training to familiarize new
employees with the physical layout of their workplace. While most
18 As defined in Section I(C), infra, "informational asymmetry" is the possession of
superior market information by sellers who refuse to disclose the information to buyers.
See Akerlof, The Market for "'Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. Econ. 488 (1970).
19 For expository reasons, services for which the ability to raise large amounts of capital
to acquire equipment, etc., is also an important determinant (e.g., the provision of satellite
communication services) are not specifically considered. With only minor modification,
however, the analysis presented is equally applicable to such services.
20 See G. BECKER. HuMAN CAPrrAL, 19-37 (1975); Becker, Investment in Human
Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J. POL. EcoN. 9, 12-13 (1962 Supp.).
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actual training is neither completely general nor completely
specific, this dichotomy is useful in explaining why alternative oc-
cupational groups may or may not be capable of supplying a par-
ticular service to the market.
For purposes of this paper, the expertise that results from
general training is referred to as "general expertise" while the ex-
pertise that results from specific training is referred to as "local in-
formation." Even though members of a licensed occupational
group may possess greater general expertise in providing a par-
ticular service, it may still be possible for other occupational
groups to provide the service if local information can be
substituted, to at least some degree, for general expertise. Dentists,
for example, possess greater general expertise in the care and treat-
ment of teeth, but dental technicians, possessing local information
about x-raying teeth, may also be able to perform that service. 2
Consequently, it is the extent to which local information can be
substituted for general expertise that determines which occupa-
tional groups have the technological ability to supply a particular
service to the market.
One possible relationship between the substitutability of local
information for general expertise and quality of service is depicted
in Figure 1.22 The vertical axis represents the degree of local infor-
mation necessary to provide a particular quality of service, and the
horizontal axis represents the degree of general expertise necessary
to provide a particular quality of service. QI, Q , and Q3 are iso-
quality lines with Qi being the lowest quality service and Q3 being
the highest quality service (i.e., Q, < Q2 < Q3). LI, L2, and L3 are
iso-expertise lines that represent combinations of local informa-
tion and general expertise where the dominant type of expertise is
local information. Points A, A2, and A3 represent the quantity
and combination of local information and general expertise
possessed by each of three respective occupational groups that
possess more local information than general expertise. G,, G2, and
G3 are iso-expertise lines representing combinations of local infor-
mation and general expertise where the dominant type of expertise
is general expertise. Points B1, B2, and B3 represent the quantity
21 See Note, Restrictive Licensing of Dental Paraprofessionals, 83 YALE L.J. 806 (1974).
22 The actual extent to which local information and general expertise may be substituted
for one another in determining an individual's competence to provide a particular service
is, of course, an unresolved empirical question. Therefore, Figure 1 is presented for ex-
pository purposes only. For a more detailed discussion of how such a figure is derived, see
BECKER, supra note 20.
1983]
ISO-EXPERTISE LINES
LOCAL
INFORMATION
ISO-EXPERTISE
LINES
S 2 03
ISO-QUALITY LINES
GENERAL
EXPERTISE
Occupational Boundary-Setting
FIGURE 1
Substitutability of Local Information for General
Expertise In the Provision of a Service
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and combination of local information and general expertise
possessed by each of three respective occupational groups that
possess more general expertise than local information.
While the actual substitutability of local information for general
expertise may vary from service to service, the figure illustrates
some important general relationships. First, members of an oc-
cupational group possessing more local information, but less
general expertise, may be able to provide a service of quality equal
to that which could be provided by members of an occupational
group possessing more general expertise (eg., A, can provide a
service equal in quality to B,). In addition, members of an occupa-
tional group possessing a particular quantity and combination of
local information and general expertise (e.g., A, or B,) may be
able to increase the quality of the service they provide by increas-
ing either their general expertise or local information. The strength
of these relationships determines the extent to which boundary-
setting actually restricts supply by precluding other qualified, but
not necessarily identically trained, suppliers from the market.
B. Elasticity of Demand for Restricted Services
If occupational boundary-setting restricts the supply and in-
creases the price of a service, then consumers will either seek
available substitutes or elect to do without the service when de-
mand for the service is sufficiently elastic. "3 The availability of
substitutes for restricted services is determined by the ability of the
market to provide acceptable surrogates via alternative forms of
information or performance. For example, if consumers are will-
ing to use information found in the Wall Street Journal instead of
the services of an investment counselor or consult a book on do-it-
yourself divorce instead of an attorney, then such publications can
be viewed as substitutes for the corresponding services.
In general, consumers will shift to a substitute only if the
changeover costs"4 are lower than the increase in the price of the
restricted service. Thus, restrictions on supply imposed by restric-
tive occupational boundary-setting will induce consumers to adopt
23 The elasticity of demand for a particular service is a measure of the extent to which
the quantity of the service purchased will decline as its price increases. Technically, elastici.
ty of demand is defined as _Q. L. If this is less than -1, the demand for the service is
elastic. a P Q
24 One implicit changeover cost is a deficiency in the quality of the substitute when com-
pared to that of the original service.
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substitutes only if the increase in the price of the restricted service
is sufficient to offset the changeover costs. Since changeover costs
vary from service to service, as well as from consumer to con-
sumer, substitutes may not be uniformly available to all con-
sumers.zs In general, the greater the availability of substitutes for a
restricted service, the smaller the impact exerted on the market
price-quality equilibrium by restrictive boundary-setting.
Overall, the elasticity of demand for a restricted service is deter-
mined by both the availability of substitutes and the willingness of
consumers to do without the service altogether. Therefore, oc-
cupational boundary-setting which causes a decrease in the supply
of a service for which demand is relatively inelastic. (i.e., a necessi-
ty) will generally exert a greater impact on the market than
boundary-setting which decreases the supply of a service common-
ly regarded as a luxury.
C. Extent of Informational Asymmetry in Markets
for Restricted Services
Over the past decade economists have also begun to evaluate oc-
cupational licensing in terms of its ability to provide information
to potential consumers about the quality of services. The emer-
gence of this informational perspective on the role ofoccupational
licensing (and, in turn, occupational boundary-setting) can be
traced to a seminal paper by George Akerlof. 26 Akerlof suggests
that occupational licensing may improve the efficiency of ex-
change in markets where buyers are unable to effectively differen-
tiate the various services offered for sale on the basis of quality. In
such markets, sellers possess information about quality, but may
refuse to disclose it to potential buyers. According to Akerlof, if
this informational disparity or "asymmetry" between buyers and
sellers is not corrected, a type of market failure referred to as
"radverse selection" may result.2 7
25 For someone who has had a long and trusted relationship with his or her stockbroker,
for example, the costs of shifting to the Wall Street Journal for investment information
may be significantly higher than for someone who has had a more formal relationship.
26 Akerlof, supra note 18, at 493.
27 Akerlof, id. at 488, explains this "adverse selection" problem as follows:
There are many markets in which buyers use some market statistic to judge the
quality of prospective purchases [e.g., average quality]. In this case there is incen-
tive for sellers to market poor quality merchandise, since the returns for good
quality accrue mainly to the entire group whose statistic is affected rather than to
the individual seller. As a result there tends to be a reduction in the average quality
of goods and also in the size of the market. It should also be perceived that in
1983]
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In order to demonstrate this adverse selection phenomenon, Ak-
erlof posits that the used car market is characterized by an asym-
metry of information between buyers and sellers so that potential
buyers cannot differentiate "lemons" from "good cars" (i.e.,
"nonlemons"). In such markets, sellers of lemons will not reveal
the quality of their merchandise and will, therefore, demand a
price consistent with the productive capabilities of a nonlemon.
Since buyers cannot differentiate lemons from nonlemons, the
market equilibrium price will be based on what buyers perceive to
be the average quality of all cars in the market, not on the actual
quality of any particular car.
FIGURE 2
Price-Quality Relationship in a Market with
Informational Asymmetry
QUALITY DISTRIBUTION
QUALITY DISTRIBUTION
p p2 1
LOW "LEMONS" NON LEMONS" IIGIi
QUALIT'
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The consequences of this unwillingness of buyers to pay a higher
price than they perceive the average quality car to be worth is dem-
onstrated by means of Figure 2. Quality distribution A represents
the density function that corresponds to the actual quality of all
possible used cars offered for sale in the market. Since buyers are
unable to differentiate lemons from nonlemons, the resulting
market price is P,, the price of an average quality car. As a result,
sellers of lemons are more than willing to sell their cars for P,, but
sellers of nonlemons will withhold their cars from the market. At
this point, only lemons are offered for sale in the market and the
quality distribution shrinks from distribution A to distribution B.
Since buyers are unable to differentiate the above-average quality
lemons in distribution B, the market price shifts from PI to P,, the
price for the average quality lemon. At this point, only below-
average lemons are offered for sale in the market and the quality
distribution again shrinks and the market price shifts further to the
left. It is this iterative process which leads to the type of market
failure which Akerlof refers to as adverse selection.
The same sort of informational asymmetry that characterizes
the used car market may be present in markets for professional
services. While the quality of professional services varies, dif-
ferences in quality often are not observable by potential buyers. If
buyers of medical services, for example, are unable to differentiate
the services offered by physicians on the basis of quality, then
high quality physicians may be unable to obtain an adequate price
for their services, and overall quality may deteriorate as higher
quality service is priced out of the market. By requiring a
minimum level of quality, occupational licensing may be one
means of averting adverse selection in markets for professional
services.
Two corollaries to Akerlof's theory have been offered in sup-
port of the notion that informational asymmetries between buyers
and sellers are often corrected by the market itself without the
need for regulatory intervention. One corollary, attributable to
Spence,2" suggests that, in markets characterized by extreme infor-
mational asymmetries, sellers of high quality services have an in-
centive to voluntarily disseminate or "signal" their qualifications
these markets social and private returns differ, and therefore, in some cases,
governmental intervention may increase the welfare of all parties.
28 Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355 (1973).
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to potential buyers. By disseminating this information to buyers, a
seller can differentiate his or her services from lower quality serv-
ices and obtain a higher than average price.2 9
In order for this voluntary dissemination or signaling to occur in
a particular market, two conditions must be present: (1) there must
be an endemic signaling mechanism available (ie., a method by
which sellers can have their assertions of quality verified to give
them credibility); and (2) there must be an expectation by sellers
that the benefits to be obtained by such signaling will exceed its
costs. In the used car market analyzed by Akerlof, there is no
endemic signaling mechanism, and hence no signaling occurs." In
markets where such a mechanism does exist, however, signaling
may automatically alleviate informational asymmetries between
buyers and sellers.
In line with this signaling corollary, Moore3' asserts that volun-
tary certification can provide the same benefits as does occupa-
tional licensing, but without its potentially anticompetitive side-
effects. This assertion suggests that voluntary certification can
facilitate signaling in markets for professional services by pro-
viding a mechanism by which sellers can elect to signal (i.e., verify)
their competency to potential buyers.
A second corollary to Akerlof's theory, attributable to Stigler,"
suggests that buyers often have an incentive to search out and ac-
quire information that will enable them to make more informed
purchasing decisions. Therefore, the problem of informational
asymmetries may be self-correcting in markets where information
is not extremely asymmetric and costly. By acquiring information
about the quality of the various services available in such markets,
buyers can avoid the purchase of overpriced services and obtain a
better value for their money."
29 This incentive is similar conceptually to that which motivates producers to advertise
their goods in order to establish a "brand-name" advantage in the market.
30 M. SPENCE. MARKET SIGNALING 93-94 (1974), notes that "Verbal declarations (by
sellers of used cars) are costless and therefore useless .... Reliability reports from the
owner's mechanic are untrustworthy.. . . Guarantees do not work. The seller may move
to Cleveland, leaving no forwarding address."
31 Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J. L. & ECON. 93, 104 (1961).
32 Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213 (1961).
33 Stigler's original concern was with price information search, not quality information
search. See also Wilde & Schwartz, Equilibrium Comparison Shopping, 46 REV. ECON.
STUD. 543 (1979); Vailan, A Model of Sales, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 651 (1980). Only recently
have models been proposed which encompass the fact that sellers choose both price and
quality, and that information on these variables may be costly for consumers to obtain.
See, e.g., Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Stand-
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For buyer search to occur in such markets, however, two condi-
tions must be present: (1) there must be an intermediary channel
(e.g., a consumer information agency or information broker)
through which buyers can acquire the information they desire; and
(2) there must be an expectation by buyers that the benefits to be
obtained from such an information search will exceed its costs.
According to Stigler, there are many markets where both these
conditions exist and buyer search may automatically alleviate in-
formational asymmetries between buyers and sellers.34
In extending this corollary, Schwartz and Wilde" imply that the
imposition of occupational licensing may hamper the emergence
(or continued existence) of the intermediary channels needed for
buyer search. This suggests that occupational licensing may actual-
ly interfere with the natural self-correcting tendencies of the
market.
In addition to occupational licensing, voluntary certification,
and buyer information search, other possible remedies for the
problem of adverse selection in markets for professional services
include the imposition of two-part tariffs and the adoption of ran-
dom licensing rather than licensing based on quality." Although
economists often differ as to which remedy is most appropriate,
current economic theory has concluded that occupational licensing
is preferable only when the market itself is unable to avert adverse
selection by means of seller signaling, buyer information search, or
some similar nonregulatory remedy."
Since restrictive boundary-setting tends to increase the impact of
occupational licensing, it may improve the efficiency of exchange
in markets where consumers are unable to distinguish alternative
services on the basis of quality. Conversely, in service markets not
ards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979); J. Farrell, A Model of Price and Quality Choice with
Informed and Uninformed Buyers (1980) (unpublished manuscript, Department of
Economics, M.I.T.); Y. Chan & H. Leland, Prices and Qualities in Markets with Costly In-
formation, (1980) (unpublished manuscript, University of California, Berkeley).
34 Stigler, supra note 32, at 220 explains that: "As the market grows . . . there will
[often] appear a set of firms that specialize in collecting and selling information. They may
take the form of trade journals or specialized brokers."
35 Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A
Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630, 637-38 (1979).
36 For a discussion of these alternatives, see Leland, supra note 33, at 1342.
37 As suggested in Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 35, at 631: "A decision to intervene [in
the market] . . . cannot be sustained by a showing that an appreciable number of
customers are uninformed; rather, the normative question should be whether the existence
of imperfect information has produced noncompetitive prices and terms."
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characterized by informational asymmetry, it may lower the effi-
ciency of exchange.
D. Assessing the Efficiency of Occupational Boundary-Setting
Efficiency of exchange in the service markets is defined as the
extent to which the marginal product (MP) of the services sold, an
indicator of quality, corresponds to their sale price (P). Conse-
quently, the short-run market price-quality equilibrium for a serv-
ice can assume one of three states:
(1) MP = P (efficient exchange);
(2) P > MP (seller-dominated exchange); or
(3) MP > P (exchange characterized by adverse selection).
Thus, the efficiency of occupational boundary-setting can be
assessed in terms of whether P and MP converge or diverge.
The extent to which occupational boundary-setting increases or
decreases the efficiency of exchange in a service market is deter-
mined by both the nature of the restrictions imposed and the
preexisting state of the market. For example, boundary-setting
that excludes only the sale of inferior services (i.e., lemons) may
improve the efficiency of exchange in a market characterized by
informational asymmetry. Conversely, boundary-setting that ex-
cludes the sale of both inferior services and services of acceptable
quality (i.e., nonlemons) may decrease the efficiency of exchange
in a market in which consumers are able to differentiate services on
the basis of quality.
This relationship between the efficiency of occupational
boundary-setting and the preexisting state of the market, which is
examined in greater detail in the next section, implies that the effi-
ciency of a particular set of restrictions cannot be assessed without
reference to the market which they affect. Accordingly, a
boundary-setting scheme that is efficient in one market may not be
efficient in another.
IV. THE ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY OF OCCUPATIONAL BOUNDARY-
SETTING BY STATE COURTS
As discussed in Section II, there is considerable variance in the
manner in which courts in different states apply the "incidental
services" doctrine. State courts that apply the doctrine narrowly
tend to establish rigid territorial boundaries for state-licensed oc-
cupations, while courts that apply the doctrine more broadly tend
to allow a greater variety of potential sellers to enter the market.
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As discussed in Section III, the extent to which occupational
boundary-setting can alter the market price-quality equilibrium
(i.e., the relationship between MP and P) for a restricted service is
determined by the extent to which potential suppliers are pre-
cluded from the market for the service, the elasticity of demand
for the service, and the extent of informational asymmetry in the
market. Therefore, the efficiency of occupational boundary-
setting that emerges from a narrow application of the "incidental
services doctrine" must be evaluated on the basis of these factors.
A. The Efficiency of Boundary-Setting Resulting
from Narrow Applications of the Incidental Services Doctrine
Since the efficiency of occupational boundary-setting emerging
from narrow applications of the incidental services doctrine is
determined by the three factors cited above, it is necessary to
understand how each affects the price-quality equilibrium in the
market for a restricted service. Viewed in a partial equilibrium
sense, the greater the tendency of boundary-setting to exclude
competent suppliers from the market, the greater the tendency for
P > MP. Also, the greater the inelasticity of demand for the
restricted service, the greater the tendency for P > MP. Finally, the
greater the informational asymmetry in the market for a restricted
service (1) the greater the tendency for MP = P if boundary-
setting excludes only inferior quality services from the market, or
(2) the greater the tendency for P > MP if boundary-setting ex-
cludes suppliers from the market on some basis other than the
quality of their services.
Given these relationships, state courts that apply the incidental
services doctrine narrowly tend to decrease the efficiency of ex-
change in a market for a restricted service when occupational
boundary-setting excludes technologically competent suppliers
from the market, demand is relatively inelastic, and potential con-
sumers are unable to distinguish inferior services from services of
acceptable quality. In such a case, the imposition of barriers in the
market disrupts the efficiency of the preexisting price-quality
equilibrium."
38 This impact can be readily understood by referring to Figure 1. In such a case, the
practical effect of occupational boundary-setting by courts in states such as Kentucky and
Florida is to restrict access to the market to groups like A,. By precluding groups like B,,
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On the other hand, state courts that apply the doctrine narrowly
tend to increase the efficiency of exchange for a restricted service
when boundary-setting excludes only inferior services from the
market and potential consumers are unable to differentiate in-
ferior services from those of acceptable quality.39 The imposition
of barriers in the market in such a case may alleviate adverse selec-
tion and allow the market to equate P with MP.
While in some cases it is possible to determine whether a narrow
application of the incidental services doctrine will increase or
decrease the efficiency of exchange for a restricted service, in other
cases it is not possible to make such an assessment. The net effect
on the efficiency of exchange cannot be readily ascertained when,
for example, occupational boundary-setting excludes both tech-
nologically competent and incompetent suppliers from the market,
demand is relatively inelastic, and potential consumers are unable
to differentiate inferior services from those of acceptable quality.
In such a case, the net effect depends on whether the increase in ef-
ficiency due to the exclusion of incompetent suppliers is sufficient
to compensate for the decrease in efficiency due to the inelasticity
of demand and the exclusion of technologically competent sup-
pliers.
B. The Efficiency of Boundary-Setting Resulting
from Broad Applications of the "Incidental Services Doctrine"
The efficiency of occupational boundary-setting that emerges
from broad applications of the incidental services doctrine is deter-
mined by the same factors used in analyzing narrow applications
of the doctrine. Viewed in a partial equilibrium sense, the greater
the failure of boundary-setting to exclude inferior services from
the market, the greater the tendency for MP = P if potential con-
sumers are able to differentiate services on the basis of quality, and
the greater the tendency for MP > P if potential consumers are
unable to differentiate services on the basis of quality. Also, since
technologically competent suppliers are not excluded from the
market, the elasticity of demand for an unrestricted service will not
affect the efficiency of exchange.
which are also technologically capable of providing the same quality of service, supply is
unnecessarily reduced and the result is P MP.
39 Since only inferior quality services are precluded from the market in such a case, the
elasticity of demand for the service is irrelevant.
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Given these relationships, state courts that apply the incidental
services doctrine broadly tend to decrease the efficiency of ex-
change in a market for a relatively unrestricted service when serv-
ices both of inferior and acceptable quality are offered for sale in
the market and potential consumers are unable to distinguish
them. Thus, the failure to impose sufficient barriers to exclude in-
ferior services from the market may contribute to the problem of
adverse selection.
By contrast, state courts that apply the doctrine broadly tend to
increase the efficiency of exchange when both inferior and accept-
able services are offered for sale in the market and potential con-
sumers are able to distinguish them. Restraint in imposing barriers
to exclude potential suppliers from the market will, in such cases,
lead to an efficient market, with MP = P.
As in the case of state courts that apply the incidental services
doctrine narrowly, there are situations in which it is not possible to
determine readily whether a broad application of the doctrine will
increase or decrease the efficiency of exchange in the market for a
service. The net effect on the efficiency of exchange cannot be
ascertained when, for example, both inferior and acceptable serv-
ices are offered for sale in the market, potential consumers are
unable to differentiate them, and there is no feasible means of
establishing barriers that will exclude only inferior services from
the market. In such a case, the net effect depends on whether the
decrease in efficiency due to adverse selection is lower than the
decrease in efficiency that would result from occupational
boundary-setting, which will exclude technologically competent
suppliers from the market.
C. Implications for State Courts
Several important implications for state courts can be- drawn
from the foregoing analysis:
(1) occupational boundary-setting that permits only a par-
ticular licensed occupational group to supply a service can
increase the efficiency of exchange in the market for the
service only if the boundary-setting can exclude inferior
services without also excluding acceptable services and if
potential consumers are largely unable to distinguish in-
ferior from acceptable quality services;
(2) the extent to which the services supplied by one occupa-
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tional group are qualitatively equivalent or inferior to those
supplied by another group is determined by both the "gen-
eral expertise" and "local information" possessed by each
group and the extent to which one form of expertise can be
substituted for the other; and
(3) the elasticity of demand for a restricted service in-
fluences the extent to which the exclusion of technologically
competent suppliers from the market will reduce the effi-
ciency of exchange.
V. CONCLUSION
Occupational boundary-setting resulting from narrow applica-
tions of the incidental services doctrine exerts an adverse effect on
the efficiency of exchange, unless only inferior services are ex-
cluded from the market and consumers are largely unable to dif-
ferentiate inferior from acceptable services. Since there is currently
no foolproof method of setting occupational boundaries to ensure
that only inferior services are excluded from the market, present
schemes of restrictive boundary-setting generally lower the short-
run efficiency of exchange in the service markets. Further, the an-
ticompetitive effects of restrictive boundary-setting may be exacer-
bated over the long run. For example, members of an occupational
group that is given an exclusive right to provide a particular service
may be able to increase the monopoly rents they earn by un-
justifiably raising the requirements for becoming a licensed
member of the group. In this fashion, licensing requirements may
be used to further reduce the supply of restricted services and drive
up prices. In addition, over the long run, restrictive boundary-
setting may stifle innovation in the provision of restricted services
by discouraging the adoption of technologically superior or more
cost-effective methodologies and procedures.4"
In the process of adjudicating the cases that come before them,
courts, either consciously or unconsciously, formulate policies
with potentially far-reaching economic consequences. As this
study illustrates, economic models and methods of analysis are
currently available to assist the judiciary in establishing effective
policy in the area of occupational boundary-setting.
40 For a discussion of how regulation of this sort can stifle innovation by the protected
group, see Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 577-84
(1959).
